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PROPER VENUE IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASEFOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING VENUE, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION MAY OCCUR WHERE THE DECISION TO DISCRIMINATE IS IMPLEMENTED IN ADDITION TO WHERE THE DECISION TO DISCRIMINATE IS MADE.Pope-Payton v. Realty Management Services, Inc., 2003 Md. App. LEXIS 8 (Jan. 31, 2003). In this employment discrimination case, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that venue was proper not only in the county where an employer’s decision to discriminate was made, but also in the county where the employer’s decision to discriminate was implemented, or felt, by the employee. Appellant, Tanya Pope-Payton, was employed by appellee, Realty Management Services, Inc. ("RMS"). Appellant filed suit against RMS in Prince George’s County, Maryland, alleging that RMS had violated section 2-222 of the Prince George’s County Code when it discriminated against her because of a physical disability. RMS, citing Md. Ann. Code art. 49B, § 42 (1957, 1998 Repl. Vol.)1, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the appropriate venue was Montgomery County. Appellant worked in Prince George’s County, and claimed that she suffered the effects of RMS’s adverse employment decisions in Prince George’s County. RMS contended that any discriminatory decisions affecting appellant’s employment were made at RMS’s main office in Montgomery County. The matter was considered by a motions judge in Prince George’s County Circuit Court, who ruled that the proper venue was Montgomery County, and the case was transferred. Appellant filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment which was denied; she subsequently filed a timely appeal. The question presented to the Court of Special Appeals was whether the discrimination alleged in appellant’s complaint "took place" in Prince George’s County. That issue necessitated an inquiry into whether discrimination "takes place" only in the county where the decision to discriminate is made or whether it may also take place in the county where the decision to discriminate was implemented. The Court looked to federal cases interpreting the venue provision found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), which reads, in pertinent part: Each United States district court and each United States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this title. Such an action may be brought in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed . . . . The Court determined that the discrimination alleged by appellant happened in Prince George’s County because it was there that RMS’s alleged decision to discriminate was implemented. The Court noted that had the decision not been implemented, no discrimination could be said to have "taken place." Aside from strict statutory interpretation, the Court provided additional grounds for its determination that venue was proper in Prince George’s County. First, appellant worked and lived exclusively in Prince George’s County, where the suit was brought. Second, the ordinance that appellant sought to enforce was enacted by the legislative body of the venue plaintiff chose. Under such circumstances, the Court believed it would produce an absurd result to interpret Md. Ann. Code art. 49B, § 42 as requiring the transfer of the case to Montgomery County so that a circuit court of that jurisdiction could interpret an ordinance passed by the Prince George’s County Council. The Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case to Prince George’s County Circuit Court for trial. |
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