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Wrongful Discharge Action Reinstated, Based On Claim That Discharge Was Statutorily Banned Retaliation
The Plaintiff, a courier for Archer Courier Systems, Inc., alleged in his complaint (filed in 1988) that he was wrongfully discharged due to his involvement in a class action suit against his employer, and because he filed a worker’s compensation claim for a back injury. The class action has been based on allegations that the employer made illegal deductions from employees’ pay to cover cargo and workers’ compensation insurance payments and was settled in 1988. The trial court dismissed the wrongful discharge claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The employee appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed, and reinstated the lawsuit. The Court noted that a statute expressly prohibits an employer from requiring an employee to pay any portion of the premium paid by the employer for workers’ compensation insurance. D.C. Code §36-316(a). The Court described at length a complex of statutory provisions designed to protect workers’ compensation benefits and the payment of wages, and to protect workers’ rights to seek redress of violations. The Court concluded that, "Here, Mr. Freas has alleged facts which, if proven, demonstrate that he was discharged in violation of a mandate explicitly set forth in District law, because he filed and prosecuted a class action suit alleging unlawful workers’ compensation insurance premium deductions from the pay of couriers. . . ." The Court noted that this case is based on a different theory than that recognized in Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28 (D.C. 1991). In Adams, the employee claimed he was discharged for refusal to violate a law. Here, the employee claimed he was discharged as an act of statutorily banned retaliation for making a complaint. The Court also distinguished Carl v. Children’s Hospital, 702 A.2d 159 (D.C. 1997). In Carl, there was no express statutory prohibition of discharge that applied to the employee’s claim. Rather, Carl required an examination of whether discharge violated the scope of a public policy embodied in a statute. In contrast, here the prohibition against retaliatory discharge was explicit under D.C. Code §36-220.9. |
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