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WRONGFUL TERMINATION VERDICT REINSTATED BASED ON BREACH OF CONTRACT AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, NOTWITHSTANDING DISCLAIMER IN POLICY MANUALStrass v. Kaiser Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic, No. 96-CV-1122 (Jan. 20, 2000) Plaintiff alleged that her employment had been terminated by Kaiser Foundation Health Plan because of her physical handicap, hypertension, in violation of the D.C. Human Rights Act, D.C. Code §1-2512(a)(i), and her employment contract. A jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $525,047.00. The trial court set aside the verdict on both the contract claim and the violation of the Human Rights Act. The trial court reasoned that the evidence was insufficient to permit a jury to conclude that there was an express or implied agreement, or that plaintiff’s physical condition could be accommodated reasonably. On appeal, the D.C. Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the issues presented were properly for the jury, which had found for Plaintiff. Plaintiff was hired by Kaiser as its Director of Public Affairs. After about three years, her doctor diagnosed her as having hypertension, which he attributed to her work situation. Her physician testified to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that if a particular stress situated at Kaiser had been eliminated, her blood pressure would have returned to normal. This was brought to her superiors’ attention. There were some efforts to explore a reasonable accommodation to reduce her stress. Ultimately, she was terminated due to her qualified refusal to not enroll in Kaiser’s Career Reappraisal Program. Kaiser felt that her negative attitude was a factor in her inability to carry out her job responsibilities effectively. At the time, Kaiser had a progressive discipline policy in its Personnel Policy Manual. The manual contained a disclaimer saying it was not a contract. However, other language in the document used mandatory terms in setting forth various condition of employment. As for the Human Rights Act claim, Kaiser argued that an employer is not required to accommodate a handicapped employee by reassigning her to a different position. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that it would further the objective of the Human Rights Act to interpret reasonable accommodation to include that the employer cannot deny an employee alternative employment opportunities reasonably available under the employer’s existing policies. The jury could properly consider evidence that there was a vacant position available which plaintiff was qualified to fill. Further, the Court held that while an employer is not required to hire employees to perform the functions of the job that a handicapped individual cannot perform, the employer cannot deliberately create conditions which render it impossible for a handicapped person to discharge the responsibilities of the position for the purpose of forcing the handicapped person to quit. Regarding the breach of contract claim, the jury had found for the plaintiff, but the trial court granted Kaiser’s post-trial motion for judgment, ruling that the disclaimer in Kaiser’s employment manual prevented an express or implied contract. The court of Appeals also reversed on this issue. The Court of Appeals stated that, "Not in every case will a contractual disclaimer clause be adequate to relieve an employer of obligations specified in its regulations." The issue was whether the disclaimers in Kaiser’s Policy Manual and Handbook entitled Kaiser to judgment as a matter of law, or whether construed in light of other provisions in the documents, a jury triable question was created as to Kaiser’s obligations to its employees before termination. The Court held that it was a jury issue. "While there is language in Kaiser’s policy manual that it is not a contract, this qualifier is rationally at odds with other language in the document. Construing the document as a whole, a jury could conclude reasonably that the employer intended to be found by its terms, including those related to its progressive discipline policy." Therefore, the trial court erred in its decision to set aside the jury’s verdict. Judge Schwelb filed a strong dissent. |
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