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SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA DECLINES TO RECOGNIZE AN EXCEPTION TO DOCTRINE OF EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL BASED ON VIRGINIA’S OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE STATUTE
In this matter, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered the following issue which had been certified from the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia: Does a complaint state a Bowman claim under Va. Code section 18.2-460 when the plaintiff, an at-will employee, alleges that her employer terminated her employment because she refused to yield to employer’s demand that she discontinue pursuing criminal charges of assault and battery against a fellow employee? The Court’s answer was no. The plaintiff, who was a cashier employed by the Tractor Supply Co., discovered information that led her to believe that her manager and other employees were embezzling money and property from the defendant. When she expressed her concerns to the manager about this activity, he reacted violently by twisting her arm and pushing her forcefully against the desk. The next day she reported this incident to the next level of management, the area manager. Plaintiff filed a civil suit against her manager, and was awarded $1500 in damages. She reported the attack to the police and charges were filed against the manager. Following the conclusion of the civil suit, the new store manager told the plaintiff that the company wanted her to drop the criminal charges, and that it would not “black-ball” her any further if she did. He also said that the area manager wanted the criminal charges dropped. Plaintiff declined. Her employment was terminated about a month after the conclusion of her civil suit. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit against the company, claiming that she was wrongfully terminated in violation of Virginia public policy. The issue before the Supreme Court of Virginia was whether plaintiff could maintain a cause of action for wrongful termination based on the public policy embodied in Virginia’s obstruction of justice statute, Va. Code sec. 18.2-460. Virginia law does recognize an exception to the doctrine of employment-at-will based on an employer’s violation of public policy in the discharge of an employee. While virtually every statute expresses a public policy of some sort, the Supreme Court of Virginia continues to consider this exception to be a narrow one and to hold that the termination of an employee in violation of the policy underlying any one statute does not automatically give rise to a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge. The Court has recognized a common law action for wrongful discharge in three instances: first, when an employer violated a policy enabling the exercise of an employee’s statutorily created right to vote stock as shareholders; second, when the public policy violated by the employer was explicitly expressed in the statute and the employee was clearly a member of that class of persons directly entitled to the protection enunciated by the public policy, such as a statute prohibiting unlawful discrimination based on gender; and third, where the discharge was based on the employee’s refusal to engage in a criminal act. Here, plaintiff argued in effect that the obstruction of justice statute vested her with a right to be free from intimidation with regard to her pressing criminal charges and in the legal processes connected to those criminal charges. However, the Supreme Court found that the obstruction of justice statute does not grant a person involved in a criminal prosecution any specific right. Further, the Court found that the obstruction of justice statute was intended to prohibit interference with the administration of justice, not to protect individuals from intimidation. The Court concluded that the company’s actions in discharging her “did not violate a right granted to her but rather violated a criminal statute enacted to ensure that the administration of justice is not subverted.” |
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