The Court considered the issue whether a landlord for an apartment complex owes a duty to social guests of a tenant who, while in the tenant’s apartment, are injured or killed by a highly dangerous pit bull dog kept by the tenant, when the landlord knew of the dog’s dangerousness, when the presence of the dog was in violation of the lease, and where the landlord could have taken steps to abate the danger. The Court’s answer was yes.

The lease prohibited any pets on the premises. The tenant, in violation of the lease, kept her boyfriend’s pit bull, named Rampage, in her apartment.

Employees of the landlord testified about dangerous encounters with the dog, that the dog was vicious, and that the incidents were reported to the resident manager.

The pit bull attacked and killed a 16-month old boy whose mother brought him to the tenant’s apartment for a visit.

The decedent’s mother brought suit against the management company and the landlord of the property stating wrongful death, survival, and reckless infliction of emotional distress actions. Three days before trial, the defendants amended their answer to add the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk. The trial court struck the new affirmative defenses.

The jury found the defendants liable on the wrongful death, survival, and reckless infliction of emotional distress claims, and awarded damages totaling over $6 million.

On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that, under the circumstances, the defendants owed no duty to the social invitees of a tenant. The Court of Appeals granted the plaintiff’s petition for a writ of certiorari, and reversed, reinstating the verdict.

A landlord is not ordinarily liable to a tenant or guest of a tenant for injuries from a hazardous condition in the leased premises that comes into existence after the tenant has taken possession. But where a landlord agrees to rectify a dangerous condition in the leased premises, and fails to do so, he may be liable for injuries caused by the condition.

Likewise, a landlord who voluntarily undertakes to rectify a dangerous or defective condition within the leased premises, and does so negligently, is liable for resulting injuries.

Third, defective or dangerous conditions in the leased premises which violate statutes or ordinances may also be the basis for a negligence action against the landlord.

A landlord has on many occasions been held liable where it had the ability to exercise a degree of control over the defective or dangerous condition and to take steps to prevent injuries arising therefrom.

The landlord in this case had a degree of control because the lease prohibited pets. Violation of the "no pets" clause was expressly a default, and would enable the landlord to evict the tenant. Short of eviction, the landlord could also have contacted the tenant to demand that she get rid of the pit bull. However, the landlord did nothing.

Harm to a tenant’s guest by Rampage was entirely foreseeable. Numerous employees of the defendant testified that they knew of the pit bull, were afraid of it, witnessed attacks by the dog, and were unable to carry out their duties because of its presence.

The Court pointed out that a landlord’s retention in the lease of some control over particular matters in the leased premises is not, standing alone, a sufficient basis to impose a duty upon the landlord which is owed to a guest on the premises. Whether or not a duty is imposed is made by weighing the various policy considerations. Here, where a landlord retained control over the matter of animals in the tenant’s apartment, coupled with the knowledge of past vicious behavior by the animal, the extremely dangerous nature of pit bulls, and the foreseeability of harm to persons and property in the apartment complex, the jury was justified in finding that the landlord had a duty to the plaintiffs and that the duty was breached.

In a strong dissent, Judge Chasanow pointed out that the child’s mother knew Rampage better than anyone except the dog’s owner, and that she and the child visited with the dog on dozens and dozens of occasions, at least weekly. Thus, the dissent argued that the issue of the mother’s contributory negligence should have gone to the jury on Count IV, the intentional infliction of emotional distress count.

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