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Plaintiff, a cook at a retirement home in D.C., alleged that she was fired for "insubordination" when she tried to stop a fellow worker from spraying stainless steel cleaner in near proximity to where she was cooking. She alleged that the spray is poisonous and if it comes into contact with food it renders the food unfit for human consumption. She alleged she could feel the spray on her and saw it going into the food. Plaintiff told the other employee to stop spraying, and the manager, who had ordered the spraying and who overheard her interference, allegedly fired her for insubordination. Plaintiff brought suit for wrongful discharge, on the theory that her co-workers’ conduct in spraying near food violated D.C. health and food regulations, and that she had been dismissed for protesting safety, health and food code violations. The defendant successfully moved for summary judgment, on the basis that plaintiff was an at-will employee, and her claim did not fall within the only public policy exception at the at-will employment doctrine that was then recognized. That trial court reasoned that plaintiff had no legal obligation to prevent food from being contaminated or to complaint about other contaminating food. Rather, her only legal obligation was not to prepare or serve until food herself. Thus, the trial court concluded that she was not put to the choice of disobeying that obligation as the price for keeping her job. The D.C. Court of Appeals reversed. The Court reasoned that health and food regulations are a clear expression of public policy. Further, conduct that imperils the health and safety of elderly residents of a retirement home is obviously contrary to public policy. To permit an employee to be fired for such actions would undermine the purposes of the food and health regulations and would frustrate public policy. If plaintiff’s allegations were true, the supervisor’s intervention had the immediate potential consequence of permitting an employee to spray residents’ food with a poisonous cleaning fluid. The Court found that here, the relationship between the discharge of the employee and the applicable public policy was thus closer in time and more palpable than in Carl v. Children’s Hosp., 702 A.2d 159 (D.C. 1997) (en banc). The Court also held that the standard articulated in the Carl opinion applies retroactively to cases in which the complaining employee was discharged prior to September 23, 1997. |
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