|
|
|
|
D.C. Court of Appeals Rules On Defamation, Wrongful Discharge, and Discrimination Claims Made By Associate Against Law Firm of Skadden, Arps
A former associate of Skadden Arps initially brought suit against that firm for defamation and wrongful discharge. In part this was based on the allegation that her character and professional qualifications had been defamed by the law firm in performance evaluations, and that she had been discharged in retaliation for insisting on adherence to ethical rules. The trial judge dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, holding that the communications in question were not defamatory; that even if they were, they were absolutely privileged because the associate had consented to them; and on other grounds. The associate appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The Court held that the communications at issue were reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning. It held that they were not protected by an absolute privilege, but only by a qualified privilege. Because the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged actual malice, the Court held that the Complaint was erroneously dismissed. In the second of the consolidated appeals, the associate had alleged, in a second suit, that Skadden, Arps had discriminated against her on account of race and marital status, in violation of the D.C. Human Rights Act. The second trial judge dismissed that action on grounds of claim preclusion. On appeal of that ruling, the Court of Appeals reversed, and reinstated the discrimination action. Concerning the question whether absolute or qualified privilege applied to internal performance evaluations, the Court pointed out that the law has long recognized a privilege for anything said or written by a master in giving the character of a servant who has been in his or her employment, but the privilege in question exists only in the absence of malice. It is a qualified privilege; to overcome the privilege, it is necessary to show malice. Regarding the wrongful discharge claim, the plaintiff argued that she was required by the Rules of Professional Conduct to report certain alleged ethical violations to her superiors. She alleged that her discharge for complying with the Rules was therefore wrongful. However, the Court found that the plaintiff’s reliance on Rules 5.1 and 5.2 of the Rules was misplaced. Rule 5.1 had no direct application to the plaintiff, who was a junior associate, rather, it sets forth responsibilities of a supervisory attorney. Rule 5.2 also does not expressly impose a duty upon the subordinate attorney to report anything to her superiors. The plaintiff argued that a duty to report is implicit in Rules 5.1 and 5.2 so that the supervisory attorney can resolve arguable questions of professional duty and comply with the supervisory responsibilities under Rule 5.1. However, the Court rejected such an inferred duty as grounds to invoke the exception to the at-will employment doctrine recognized in Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28 (D.C. 1991). Adams had held that a discharged at-will employee may sue his or her former employer for wrongful discharge when the sole reason for the discharge is the employee’s refusal to violate the law, as expressed in a statute or municipal regulation. However, the Court in Wallace found that the alleged ethical misconduct at issue was generally not the type of conduct requiring a report to Bar Counsel or a partner. Nor was it sufficient to trigger the application of a "public policy" exception to the at-will doctrine. The Court had greater difficulty with one allegation, in which the associate claimed to have reported to her superiors about instances of other attorneys lying to clients by altering the as-filed documents after they had been filed. The Court, viewing the allegation in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, stated, "If Skadden, Arps attorneys made material alterations in documents without obtaining the client’s consent, such conduct was not only improper but seriously so." But the Court found that occurrence was not the sole, or even the primary, reason that the plaintiff had been discharged 21 months later. The Court held that the plaintiff’s claim for wrongful termination fails, stating that the narrow exceptions to the at-will doctrine "were not designed to prevent an employer from terminating an at-will employee in order to eliminate unacceptable internal conflict and turmoil. . . . An employer is not required to tolerate an intolerable working environment." The Court reversed the dismissal of the second action on the grounds that an exception to the doctrine of res judicata applied, namely, when evidence could not have been discovered with due diligence. Because the plaintiff alleged that, even with due diligence, she could not have discovered the discrimination when she brought the first suit, the complaint in the second suit should not have been dismissed. |
|
Send E-mail to info(at)jocs-law.com with questions
or comments about this web site.
General contact information.
|
